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(PARTIAL) CLARITY: ELIMINATING THE CONFUSION
ABOUT THE REGULATION OF THE “FACT”UAL BASES FOR
EXPERT TESTIMONY UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE

EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED*
ABSTRACT
Expert testimony is offered at the vast majority of trials in courts
of general jurisdiction in the United States. Federal Rules of
Evidence 702-06 govern the admissibility of such testimony. In its
May 15, 2021, report accompanying the most recent proposed amendment to Rule 702, the Advisory Committee on the Evidence Rules
asserts that “many courts” have misapplied Rule 702 by holding that
questions as to whether “the expert has relied on sufficient facts or
data ... are questions of weight and not admissibility.” Rule 702(b)
states that to be admissible, an expert opinion must be “based on
sufficient fact or data.” The Committee adds that this error has
occurred “in a fair number of cases.”
* Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Davis;
former chair, Evidence Section, American Association of Law Schools; coauthor, PAUL C.
GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA L. ROTH, JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY & VALENA
BEETY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (6th ed. 2020) (3 vols.).
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The Committee’s criticism is valid—but incomplete. The central
contention of this Article is that another major, contributing cause to
the problem is the courts’ misunderstanding of the relationship
between the expression “scientific ... knowledge” in Rule 702 and the
expressions “facts” or “facts or data” which appear in Rules 702(b),
702(d), 703, and 705. This Article contends that properly interpreted,
the latter expressions include only case-specific information, not
research data relevant to the validation of the expert’s methodology
as reliable “scientific ... knowledge.”
Positing that interpretation, this Article then attempts to clarify
the judge’s and jury’s roles in evaluating the credibility, quality, and
quantity of the factual bases for proffered expert opinions. More
specifically, the Article argues that the jury has the exclusive authority to pass on the credibility of the testimony about the factual bases
of admitted opinions. However, before admitting the opinion, the
judge must assess the quality of the type of case-specific information
that the expert contemplates relying on. If the information takes the
form of secondhand reports about out-of-court statements, under
Rule 703 the judge must determine whether the “experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data.”
Moreover, again before allowing the expert to submit his or her
opinion to the jury, under Rule 702(b) the judge must independently
assess the quantity of the information. For example, if an accident
reconstruction expert proposes opining about the point of impact
(POI) in a case, the judge must inquire whether the expert has
identified enough case-specific information such as testimony about
the vehicles’ final resting places and the location of the debris to
adequately support a conclusion about POI.
These conclusions not only respect the legitimate authority of both
judge and jury, but they also give the Rule provisions on expert
testimony logical coherence.
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INTRODUCTION
“[C]larity is the hardest thing of all.”—Julian Barnes1

It is a commonplace observation that expert testimony figures
prominently in modern trials. In 1980, the National Center for State
Courts released the results of a nationwide survey of trial judges
and attorneys.2 In that survey, the respondents indicated that they
encountered expert testimony in approximately one-third of their
trials.3 However, by the early 1990s the use of expert testimony had
dramatically accelerated and become much more widespread.4 By
the time of the famous 1990 RAND Corporation study of the use of
such testimony in California Superior Court civil trials,5 the
researchers discovered that experts appeared in 86 percent of the
cases.6 On average, there were 3.3 experts per trial.7 A more recent
study reported that that figure has risen to 4.3 experts per trial.8
One prosecutor has claimed that today expert testimony on such
topics as DNA typing is “the backbone of every circumstantial
evidence case.”9 One commentator committed only mild hyperbole
when he asserted that in the United States, trial by jury is evolving
into trial by expert.10
Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence contains the provisions governing the admissibility of opinion testimony.11 While Rule
701 controls the admission of lay opinion testimony, Rules 702-06

1. JULIAN BARNES, FLAUBERT’S PARROT 102 (1984).
2. Study to Investigate Use of Scientific Evidence, 7 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS. REP. 1
(Aug. 1980).
3. Id.
4. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Exploring the
Significance of the Distinction Between Foundational Validity and Validity as Applied, 70
SYRACUSE L. REV. 817, 817 (2020).
5. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1120 n.19.
6. Id. at 1119.
7. Id.
8. See RONALD J. ALLEN, RICHARD B. KUHNS, ELEANOR SWIFT, DAVID S. SCHWARTZ &
MICHAEL S. PARDO, EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 649 (5th ed. 2011).
9. Ward F. Clark, Scientific Evidence, in THE PROSECUTOR’S DESKBOOK 542 (Patrick F.
Healy & James P. Manak eds., 1971).
10. William T. Pizzi, Expert Testimony in the US, 145 NEW L.J. 82 (1995).
11. FED. R. EVID. 701.
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contain numerous prescriptions regulating expert testimony.12 Some
of those provisions surface again and again in the published
opinions.13 For example, when the judge faces the threshold question of whether there is an absolute or relative necessity for resorting to expert testimony, Rule 702(a) is on point; 702(a) announces
that the judge must find that the testimony would “help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”14 If
the judge concludes that an expert opinion on the subject would be
helpful, the proponent must then lay the other elements of the
foundation.15 To begin with, under the Supreme Court’s celebrated
1993 Daubert decision, the proponent must establish that the expert
employed a reliable methodology;16 in the words of Rule 702(c), these
must be “reliable principles and methods.”17 Next, the expert applies
that methodology to assess the significance of certain facts in the
case, such as a DNA sample or a psychiatric patient’s case history.
Rule 703 speaks to the “kinds” of facts the expert applies the methodology to,18 and Rule 702(b) announces that the expert’s opinion
must be “based on sufficient facts or data.”19 Rule 702(d) demands
proof that the expert “reliably applied” the methodology to those
facts.20 Ultimately, the application of the methodology to the facts
of the case yields the expert’s final opinion. Rule 704 addresses the
limitations on the wording of that opinion,21 and Rule 705 discusses
which components of his or her reasoning the expert may withhold
on direct examination.22 At least at first blush, these provisions
seem to constitute a detailed, comprehensive framework for a judge
passing on the admissibility of expert testimony.
Given this apparently comprehensive framework and the frequency with which expert testimony is proffered at trial, one would
hope that by now the courts would have developed a clear, coherent
12. See FED. R. EVID. 701-06.
13. See id.
14. FED. R. EVID. 702(a).
15. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS § 4.10 (11th ed. 2020).
16. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
17. FED. R. EVID. 702(c).
18. FED. R. EVID. 703.
19. FED. R. EVID. 702(b).
20. FED. R. EVID. 702(d); see Imwinkelried, supra note 4, at 819, 828 (discussing United
States v. Gissantaner, 417 F. Supp. 3d 857 (W.D. Mich. 2019)).
21. See FED. R. EVID. 704.
22. See FED. R. EVID. 705.
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analysis to assess the admissibility of expert testimony. After all,
the basic structure of the Rule 702-06 scheme has been in place for
almost half a century.23 In their earliest form, these provisions
became law on July 1, 1975, the effective date of the Federal Rules
of Evidence.24 Yet, sadly, forty-seven years later a coherent analytic
framework is still lacking. Even today both judges25 and academic
commentators loudly complain that the judicial application of the
Federal Rules’ expert testimony provisions is confused and unsatisfactory.26 In particular, the critics assert that despite the thousands
of cases applying Rules 702-06 to date, it remains unclear to what
extent and how the courts should evaluate the “factual” bases of
expert opinion testimony.27 These questions relate to the fundamental problem of the tripartite division of labor with respect to the
factual bases: What is the extent of the judge’s authority, what role
does the jury play, and which issues, if any, does the expert have the
final say on?
This short Article does not undertake the Herculean task of
trying to end all the controversies surrounding Article VII. For
example, this Article does not address the longstanding, thorny
problem of determining the reliability of methodologies used by
nonscientific expert witnesses.28 Rather, the limited objective of this
23. See RONALD L. CARLSON, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, JULIE SEAMAN & ERICA BEECHERMONAS, EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 13, 15 (8th
ed. 2018).
24. See id.
25. See Thomas D. Schroeder, Toward a More Apparent Approach to Considering the
Admission of Expert Testimony, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2039, 2043, 2059-60 (2020).
26. See generally David E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert: It’s Time to
Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2015); Joseph Sanders,
Applying Daubert Inconsistently?: Proof of Individual Causation in Toxic Tort and Forensic
Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1367 (2010); Jennifer Laser, Note, Inconsistent Gatekeeping in
Federal Courts: Application of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to Nonscientific
Expert Testimony, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1379 (1997).
27. See Schroeder, supra note 25, at 2045, 2049, 2055, 2057; Bernstein & Lasker, supra
note 26, at 17, 30-33.
28. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert
Testimony: A Partial Answer to the Questions Left Unresolved by Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 52 ME. L. REV. 19, 35 (2000) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability
of Nonscientific Expert Testimony]; Edward J. Imwinkelried, Admissibility of Nonscientific
Expert Testimony, 32 TRIAL, Oct. 1996, at 58; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After
Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of
Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2273-74, 2279 (1994) [hereinafter
Imwinkelried, Next Step After Daubert].
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Article is to clarify the regulation of the “factual” bases of expert
opinion testimony. One thesis of this Article is that the root source
of the confusion is the failure of many courts to identify the key interpretive issue, namely, the meaning of the expression “facts and
data”—language that appears identically in Rules 702(b), 703, and
705. Admittedly, on its face, the reference to “data” is broad enough
to refer to scientific research data, such as the empirical data in
studies validating new DNA methodologies—data that could be
applied in multiple cases.29 However, this Article instead argues
that the language ought to be construed narrowly to apply only to
case-specific facts such as the who, what, where, when, why, and
how of the historical events disputed in the particular case. The
Article further contends that if the courts were to embrace that
interpretation of the language in Rules 702(b), 703, and 705, there
would emerge a clear picture of the parameters of legitimate
regulation of the factual bases of expert opinions.
To develop those theses, this Article proceeds in four parts. Parts
I and II are descriptive. Part I chronicles the history of Rules 70205, including the important 2000 amendments and the 2011
restyling. Part II then surveys the confusion in the cases about the
respective roles of the judge, jury, and expert in assessing the
factual bases of expert opinions. In contrast, Parts III and IV are
evaluative. Part III addresses the key statutory construction question: the meaning of the expression “facts or data” in Rules 702(b),
703, and 705. Again, Part III argues for a narrow construction of
that language, excluding scientific research “data” transcending the
historical events in the specific case. Positing that construction, Part
IV then shifts to the question of the regulation of the factual bases
of expert opinions. Part IV defines the legitimate roles of the judge
and expert under Article VII and, by process of elimination, the
remaining, critical role of the jury in gauging the credibility of
testimony setting out the factual bases for expert opinions.

29. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory of the Structure of Federal
Rule of Evidence 703, 47 MERCER L. REV. 447, 452-54 (1996).
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I. A DESCRIPTION OF THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE PROVISIONS GOVERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY
As previously stated, Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence
contains five provisions, Rules 702 through 706, that purport to
control the admissibility of expert testimony.30 The current version
of three provisions, Rules 702(b), 703, and 705, contains the
language that is the focus of this Article, “facts or data.”31 If the
Rules’ scheme governing expert testimony is to cohere at all, those
provisions must be harmonized. It is one of the most basic,32 default
principles in statutory construction that if a statutory scheme
repeats the same wording in several passages, the passages should
ordinarily be given the same meaning.33 The court of appeals34 and
district court35 cases recognizing the principle are legion. The
Supreme Court itself has invoked the principle on numerous occasions.36 Admittedly, this interpretive maxim does not operate as
a full-fledged, invariable rule.37 Rather, the maxim functions as a
30. See FED. R. EVID. 702-06.
31. FED. R. EVID. 702(b), 703, 705.
32. First City Bank v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 111 F.3d 433, 437-38 (6th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1146 (1998); Hanson Cold Storage Co. v. Chizek Elevator &
Transp., Inc., 205 F. Supp. 3d 920, 924-25 (W.D. Mich. 2016).
33. Sargeant v. Hall, 951 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 2020).
34. See Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 626 F.3d 799, 803 (5th Cir. 2010); Caldwell v.
Dretke, 429 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 2005); Jackson v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 331 F.3d
790, 795 (11th Cir. 2003); Hous. Police Officers’ Union v. City of Houston, 330 F.3d 298, 303
(5th Cir. 2003); Vielma v. Eureka Co., 218 F.3d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 2000); Timex V.I., Inc. v.
United States, 157 F.3d 879, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1998); United States v. Regents of Univ. of Minn.,
154 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Slevin, 106 F.3d 1086, 1088 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d
533, 537 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1072 (1996).
35. See Burns v. Cicchi, 702 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.N.J. 2010); Former Emps. of Murray
Eng’g v. Chao, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1272 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004); Dillard v. Jones, 89 F. Supp.
2d 1362, 1365, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2000), aff’d, 46 F. App’x 617 (11th Cir. 2002); Johnson v.
Garraghty, 57 F. Supp. 2d 321, 325-26 (E.D. Va. 1999); Student Loan Mktg. Ass’n v. Riley, 907
F. Supp. 464, 475 (D.D.C. 1995), aff’d, 104 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S 913
(1997); Mittendorf v. Stone Lumber Co., 874 F. Supp. 292, 295 (D. Or. 1994).
36. See Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 320 (2014); Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523
U.S. 213, 220-21 (1998); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 573-74 (1995); Dep’t of
Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 342 (1994); Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United
States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
37. United States v. Rivera, 662 F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Damon, 595
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rebuttable presumption.38 Nevertheless, it is a strong presumption39 because it rests on a natural,40 sensible assumption as to the
drafters’ intent.41
In some situations, the presumption has special force.42 For
several reasons, this is one of those situations. To begin with, the
words of these Rules were carefully chosen. The Rules of Evidence
legislative package was not rushed or hurried; the Judicial Conference devoted seven years to studying the project before the Supreme
Court transmitted the draft to Congress, and Congress then
deliberated over the draft for more than two years.43 Rather than
rubberstamping the draft, in some cases, such as Article V on privileges, Congress made extensive changes to the draft’s wording.44
Moreover, the drafters worked on the three provisions simultaneously; as they worked on each provision, the drafters must have
been aware of the other provisions. In addition, the subject matters
F.3d 395, 400 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1220 (2014); Verizon Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 555
F.3d 270, 273, 275 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1213 (10th Cir. 2006)
(stating no per se rule); Moreland v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 431 F.3d 180, 188 (5th Cir. 2005)
(declaring that it is not an absolute directive), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1106 (2006);
Theodoropoulos v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 358 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 2002) (not
rigid), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 823 (2004); Vanscoter v. Thompson, 920 F.2d 1441, 1446, 1448
(9th Cir. 1990); Citizens for Pa.’s Future v. Wheeler, 469 F. Supp. 3d 920, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
(stating the importance of context); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Kelly, 434 F. Supp. 3d 974,
989-90 (D. Kan. 2020); United States v. Trs. of Bos. Coll., 831 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446 (D. Mass.
2011) (stating the importance of context); FCC v. IFC Credit Corp., 543 F. Supp. 2d 925, 934,
938 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (declaring the interpretation not mandatory).
38. Arevalo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 872 F.3d 1184, 1195-96 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v.
Cinergy Corp., 458 F.3d 705, 710-11 (7th Cir. 2006); Voracek v. Nicholson, 421 F.3d 1299,
1304 (Fed. Cir. 2005); United States v. Balogun, 146 F.3d 141, 145-47 (2d Cir. 1998); Allen v.
CSX Transp., Inc., 22 F.3d 1180, 1181-82 (D.C. Cir. 1994); S & M Inv. Co. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan.
Agency, 911 F.2d 324, 326, 328 (9th Cir. 1990); Jackson Purchase Med. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs., 122 F. Supp. 3d 668, 673-74 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
39. Off. Comm. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir. 2003), cert.
dismissed, 540 U.S. 1001 (2003); Taylor v. Dir., Off. of Workers Comp. Programs, 201 F.3d
1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000).
40. Sw. Power Admin. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 763 F.3d 27, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2014);
Netcoalition v. SEC, 715 F.3d 342, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2013); U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 637
F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1215 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009), aff’d, 621 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 565 U.S. 821 (2011).
41. Oppedisano v. Holder, 769 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 872
(2015); Drescher v. Shatkin, 280 F.3d 201, 206 (2d Cir. 2002).
42. Butler v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 331 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
43. See CARLSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 14-15.
44. See 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 4.2.2
(4th ed. 2021).
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of the three provisions are closely related in a policy sense.45 All
three Rules purport to be and are intended to be regulations of expert testimony.46 It stands to reason that the drafters would have
wanted the Rules to work together in a rational fashion. Finally, the
Rules are proximate; Rules 702 and 703 are immediately adjacent,
and they are separated from Rule 705 by only one provision, Rule
704.47 The more proximate statutory provisions are, the more
overpowering is the inference that the drafters intended the same
language to have the identical meaning in all of the provisions.48
Again, Article VII contains five provisions concerning expert testimony. Since the language, “facts and data,” appears verbatim in the
majority of those provisions, common sense dictates that the interpretation of that language is an important clue to the essential
design of Article VII’s scheme for regulating expert testimony.49 In
that light, we turn to the history of Rules 702, 703, and 705.
A. Federal Rule 702
The original version of Rule 702, which took effect in 1975, was
relatively short:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise.50

The original version did not contain any reference to “facts or data.”
On three occasions during the 1990s, the Supreme Court layered
important judicial gloss onto the Rule. Initially, the Court rendered
45. See Eley v. District of Columbia, 47 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2014).
46. See FED. R. EVID. 702, 703, 705.
47. See id.
48. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 698 F.3d 357, 37071 (7th Cir. 2012) (consecutive provisions); United States v. LaFaive, 618 F.3d 613, 617 (7th
Cir. 2010) (close together); United States v. Kowal, 527 F.3d 741, 746-47 (8th Cir. 2008) (close
proximity), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1038 (2008); Chi. Area I.B. of T. Health & Welfare Tr. Fund
v. Zaccone, 874 F. Supp. 188, 191 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
49. See FED. R. EVID. 702, 703, 705.
50. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (quoting FED. R. EVID.
702).
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its 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmceuticals, Inc.51
In that case, the plaintiff alleged that her use of the defendant’s
anti-nausea drug, Bendectin, caused her child to be born with limb
deformities.52 The Daubert Court assigned trial judges a new “gatekeeping”53 responsibility to screen out unreliable testimony.54 To
define that responsibility, the Court addressed the interpretation of
the expression, “scientific ... knowledge,” in Rule 702.55 The Court
held that to serve as a basis for admissible expert testimony, a
purported scientific methodology must be reliable.56 The Court
reached that holding in two interpretive steps. First, the Court
considered the noun, “knowledge.”57 The Court asserted that “the
word ‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”58 Second, the Court took up the meaning of the
adjective, “scientific.”59 The Court gave the term a methodological
definition.60 Rather than equating the adjective with a set of substantive propositions,61 the Court viewed science as “a process for
proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world
that are subject to further testing and refinement”62—in other
words, the classic methodology of observing phenomena, formulating a hypothesis to explain the phenomena, subjecting the hypothesis to empirical testing to validate or falsify the hypothesis, and
then critically evaluating the results of the test. The Court stated
that to qualify as reliable scientific knowledge, a hypothesis “must
be supported by appropriate validation.”63 After announcing the
requirement for a showing of reliability, the Court provided lower
courts with a non-exhaustive64 list of factors that they should
51. Id. at 597.
52. Id. at 582.
53. Id. at 597.
54. Id. at 589, 596-97.
55. Id. at 589-90.
56. Id. at 597.
57. Id. at 590.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Daubert Decision: Frye Is Dead, Long Live the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 29 TRIAL, Sept. 1993, at 60, 62.
61. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 593 (not a “definitive checklist”).
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consider in assessing the sufficiency of the validation of the
methodology: whether the theory or technique can be empirically
tested; whether it has in fact been tested; whether the methodology
has been subjected to peer review and publication; whether the
methodology has a known or potential error rate; whether there are
recognized standands for using the methodology; and whether the
methodology enjoys general acceptance in the relevant scientific
fields.65 Although the primary focus of the opinion is on the reliability of the scientific expert’s methodology,66 the Court also mentioned
that the lower courts ought to inquire “whether that ... methodology
properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”67 In addition to
formulating a new substantive admissibility test, the Court clarified
the procedure for administering the test; the Court specified that
Federal Rule 104(a) governed the findings of fact required to apply
the test.68 When 104(a) applies, the trial judge acts as a true fact
finder and may pass on the credibility of the foundational
testimony.69
The Court’s second occasion to comment on Rule 702 came in
1997 in General Electric Co. v. Joiner.70 In part, the Court accepted
65. Id. at 593-94.
66. Id. at 592-95.
67. Id. at 592-93.
68. Id. at 592.
69. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Determining Preliminary Facts Under Federal Rule 104,
45 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, 14 (1992). The current version of Rule 104(a) reads: “In General. The
court must decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege
exists, or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules,
except those on privilege.” FED. R. EVID. 104(a). Contrast Rule 104(b). When Rule 104(b) applies, the judge must accept the proponent’s foundational testimony at face value and cannot
assess its credibility. In pertinent part, Rule 104(b) reads: “Relevance That Depends on a
Fact. When the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist.” FED. R. EVID. 104(b). The
wording of Rules 602 (personal knowledge) and 901(a) (authentication) incorporates the 104(b)
standard. FED. R. EVID. 602, 901(a). In these situations, the judge decides only the question
of the legal sufficiency of the foundational testimony to support a permissive inference that
the witness had firsthand knowledge or that the document is authentic. If so, the judge allows
the proponent to submit the evidence to the jury; and the jury passes on credibility and decides whether in fact the witness has personal knowledge or whether the document is genuine. We trust the jury to make this detemination; if the jurors decide that the witness “doesn’t
know what he’s talking about” or that the exhibit “isn’t worth the paper it’s written on,” common sense will naturally lead them to disregard the testimony during their deliberations. See
CARLSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 95. Thus, the jurors’ exposure to the foundational testimony
on those issues will not distort their deliberations or create the risk of a wrongful verdict.
70. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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the Joiner case because, after Daubert, the courts of appeals had
split over the question of the scope of review of trial court Daubert
rulings.71 Some courts had held that a broader scope was appropriate when the lower court ruling was outcome determinative in the
sense that it excluded testimony that was essential to the plaintiff’s
prima facie case.72 The Court resolved that division of authority by
announcing that across the board the appropriate scope of review is
the deferential abuse of discretion standard.73 However, in the
course of the opinion the Court also harked back to Daubert’s substantive teachings. As previously stated, the Daubert Court directed
lower courts to inquire both whether the scientist had utilized a
reliable methodology and whether the methodology could be properly applied to the instant fact situation.74 The Joiner Court elaborated on the latter point:
Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. But
nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence
requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A
court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical
gap between the data and the opinion proffered.75

To use terminology popularized by a 2016 report of the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology,76 the judge ought to
ensure both that the methodology is foundationally reliable and that
the application of the method to the present fact situation is valid—
validity as applied.77
At the very end of the 1990s—while the Judicial Conference was
working on a proposed amendment to Rule 702—the Supreme Court
See Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 5-6.
Joiner, 522 U.S. at 141.
Id. at 142-43.
509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
522 U.S. at 146.
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT,
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURECOMPARISON METHODS 42-43 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/N82ZMYKU].
77. Imwinkelried, supra note 4, at 825-31 (discussing United States v. Gissantaner, 417
F. Supp. 3d 857 (W.D. Mich. 2019)).
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
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decided Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.78 Kumho completes the socalled Daubert trilogy. As previously stated, to reach its decision,
the Daubert Court had construed the adjective “scientific” preceding the noun “knowledge.”79 However, there were four intervening
words between “scientific” and “knowledge”: “technical, or other
specialized.”80 The question arose whether Daubert extends to nonscientific expert testimony. Just as the Court accepted the Joiner
case to end the split of authority over the scope of review,81 the
Court took Kumho to resolve the division of authority over the
applicability of Daubert to nonscientific expertise.82 On the one
hand, the Court held that Daubert’s general requirement of a
showing of reliability applies.83 All expert testimony must qualify
as “knowledge” in the manner that Daubert had explicated that
term.84 On the other hand, the Court recognized that the specific
factors listed in Daubert were largely derived from a traditional
model of scientific methodology.85 The Court stated that in a given
case involving nonscientific expertise, one or more of those factors
might be irrelevant.86 In Joiner, the Court accorded trial judges
discretion in applying the factors listed in Daubert when they
undertake to assess the reliability of a purportedly scientific
methodology.87 In Kumho, the Court went further and granted trial
judges a deeper type of discretion to select factors that would be
“reasonable measures of [the] reliability” of a proffered nonscientific
expert theory or technique.88 The Court made the vague remark that
“we can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time
the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we
now do so for subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by
kind of evidence.”89
78. 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 16.
79. 509 U.S. at 589-90.
80. Id. at 588.
81. See Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 5-6.
82. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141.
83. Id. at 149.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 147.
86. Id. at 149-50.
87. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (holding that the applicable
standard of review is abuse of discretion).
88. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153.
89. Id. at 150.

734

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:719

In 2000, at the beginning of the next decade, Rule 702 was amended.90 As we have seen, the 1993 Daubert decision spawned a
number of splits of authority over Rule 702. In both Joiner and
Kumho, the Court had felt compelled to intervene to resolve particularly troublesome splits.91 For its part, the Judicial Conference
believed that it was advisable to amend Rule 702 to quell other
splits of authority and to encourage the courts to adopt a more
“structured” approach to admissibility analysis under Daubert.92
Given the vagueness of the Kumho Court’s remark about the applicability of the Daubert factors to nonscientific expertise,93 many
district court judges undoubtedly believed that more definite guidance was in order.
Consequently, in 2000 the following amended version of Rule 702
became law:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based
upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.94

Some things remained the same. For example, like the original version of the Rule, the amended version referred to “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge”95—the language from which
the Daubert and Kumho Courts had derived the general reliability
standard.96 For that matter, amended 702(2) confirmed the teaching
of Daubert and Kumho that the language necessitates a foundational showing that the expert is employing a general methodology,

90. See Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 6.
91. See id. at 5-6.
92. Id. at 6-7 (citing a 1999 Advisory Committee of Evidence report on the proposed
amendment).
93. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150.
94. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE HANDBOOK: 2011-12 REVISED EDITION 42 (2011)
[hereinafter RULES OF EVIDENCE HANDBOOK].
95. See Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 38.
96. See id.
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“principles and methods,” that are reliable.97 However, some provisions were new. Amended Rule 702(3) made explicit what was at
least implicit in Daubert and Joiner: the proponent’s need to establish validity as applied as well as foundational validity.98 Most
importantly for our present inquiry, for the first time the Rule referred to “facts or data” in 702(1).99
In 2011, the Federal Rules of Evidence were “restyled.”100 The
Advisory Committee rephrased the Rules to conform their wording
to the format of the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure.101 However, the Committee issued an accompanying Note for
every restyled provision, including Rules 702, 703, and 705, to the
effect that the resytling was not intended to effect substantive
alteration or change the result in any case.102 As restyled, Rule 702
now reads:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case.103

The crucial reference to “facts or data” now appears in Rule
702(b).104
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See id. at 26.
See id. at 31.
See id.
FED. R. EVID. 101 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 702, 703, 705 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendments.
CARLSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 921-22.
RULES OF EVIDENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 94, at 42.

736

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:719

B. Federal Rule 703
Unlike the original version of Rule 702, the original version of
Rule 703 contained the expression “facts or data.”105 In fact, the
original version included the expression twice.106 However, just as
the original version of Rule 702 was briefer than the current version, the original version of Rule 703 was shorter than its current
version. The original version consisted of only two sentences:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made
known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences ... the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be
admitted.107

Just as the emergence of splits of authority led to the 2000
amendment of Rule 702, a similar development prompted a 2000
amendment of Rule 703. In the case of Rule 703, the primary split
of authority related to the construction of the second sentence in
the original version of the Rule.108 Suppose that in forming his or
her opinion, the expert relies on a third party’s report. For instance,
assume that a psychiatrist rested an opinion about an accused’s insanity in part on a report by a third party who had observed bizarre
conduct by the accused. If the report was an essential part of the
expert’s reasoning but did not fall within any recognized exception
to the hearsay rule, could the expert nevertheless disclose the
contents of the report to the jury?109 On its face, the second sentence
authorized the disclosure of only “the opinion or inference;”110 but
the counterargument was that the jury could not intelligently
evaluate the opinion without knowing the underlying factual

105. FED. R. EVID. 703 (1978).
106. Id.
107. RULES OF EVIDENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 94, at 43.
108. See JoAnne A. Epps, Clarifying the Meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 36 B.C.
L. REV. 53, 54-55 (1994).
109. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
110. FED. R. EVID. 703 (2000).
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report.111 The Advisory Committee proposed a compromise that took
effect in 2000. The compromise took the form of adding a third
sentence to the text of the Rule; the new third sentence provided
that:
Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be
disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference
unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.112

In effect, the third sentence created a rebuttable presumption
against disclosure of the inadmissible report to the jury.113 By virtue
of the third sentence, the expert could reveal the report to the jury
only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the report was an
essential premise of the expert’s reasoning but the report did not
relate to a central, disputed historical event on the merits of the
case.
There is a further parallel to Rule 702. Like Rule 702, Rule 703
was restyled in 2011. The current version of the Rule now reads:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that
the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If
experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those
kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they
need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the
facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of
the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative
value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.114

The style of the restyled version differs slightly from the 2000
version. For example, while the first sentence in both the original
and 2000 versions of the Rule referred to “facts or data in the particular case,”115 the reference has been modified to “facts or data in
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Epps, supra note 108, at 55.
RULES OF EVIDENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 94, at 43.
FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
CARLSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 922.
FED. R. EVID. 703 (2000).

738

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:719

the case.”116 In addition, the word “type” in the second sentence of
the original and 2000 versions of the Rule117 was changed to “kinds”
in the 2011 restyling.118 However, like the 2011 version of Rule 702,
the 2011 version of Rule 703 is accompanied by an Advisory Committee Note stating that in revising the wording of the Rule, the
drafters did not intend to change the substantive outcome in any
case.119 Most importantly, though, like the 2000 version, the 2011
version contains three explicit references to “facts or data.”120
C. Federal Rule 705
Unlike the original versions of Rule 702 and 703, the original
version of Rule 705 was amended in 1993, not in 2000.121 The purpose of the 1993 amendment was to make it clear that the Rule does
not apply in the pretrial setting governed by the Federal Rules of
Civil and Criminal Procedure.122 By its terms, Rule 705 allows the
proponent’s expert to withhold certain information on direct examination.123 Prior to the amendment, some parties had contended that
Rule 705 allowed them to refuse to disclose such information “in
advance of trial” even if the discovery provisions of Civil Rule 26 or
Criminal Rule 16 otherwise required the disclosure.124 The amendment ended that “arguable conflict.”125 Furthermore, like Rules 702
and 703, Rule 705 was restyled in 2011 and presently reads:
Unless the court orders otherwise, an expert may state an
opinion—and give the reasons for it—without first testifying to
the underlying facts or data. But the expert may be required to
disclose those facts or data on cross-examination.126

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

FED. R. EVID. 703 (2012).
FED. R. EVID. 703 (2000).
FED. R. EVID. 703 (2012).
FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
CARLSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 922.
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The most significant common denominator is that like Rules 702(b)
and 703, Rule 705 uses the precise language, “facts or data.”127 In
short, the expression now appears once in Rule 702(b),128 twice in
Rule 705,129 and three times in Rule 703.130
II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT CONFUSION OVER THE
JUDICIAL REGULATION OF THE FACTUAL BASES FOR EXPERT
TESTIMONY UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
There has been sharp criticism of the state of both the general expert testimony jurisprudence under the Federal Rules and the specific case law concerning the factual bases for expert opinions.
A. The State of the Jurisprudence on General Expert Testimony
The critics fault many courts for muddling the law governing the
admissibility of expert testimony in federal court.131 The Evidence
Rules Advisory Committee, in comments related to a proposed
amendment to Rule 702, has stated:
[M]any courts have declared that the reliability requirements
set forth in Rule 702(b) and (d)—that the expert has relied on
sufficient facts or data and has reliably applied a reliable methodology—are questions of weight and not admissibility, and
more broadly that expert testimony is presumed to be admissible. These statements can be read to misstate Rule 702, because
its admissibility requirements must be met by a preponderance
of the evidence. The Committee has determined that in a fair
number of cases, the courts have found expert testimony admissible even though the proponent has not satisfied the Rule
702(b) and (d) requirements by a preponderance of the evidence.132

127. FED. R. EVID. 705.
128. FED. R. EVID. 702(b).
129. FED. R. EVID. 705.
130. FED. R. EVID. 703.
131. See Schroeder, supra note 25, at 2039.
132. Memorandum from Hon. Patrick J. Schiltz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules
to Hon. John D. Bates, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. 6 (May 15, 2021).
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The critics have characterized the courts’ attitude as at best
“lackadaisical,”133 and at worst “recalcitrant.”134 Many courts have
seemingly willfully135 ignored the new requirements prescribed by
the 2000 amendment to Rule 702.136 In the critics’ view, many courts
have resisted enforcing the amendment’s provisions.137 Rather than
fulfilling their gatekeeping responsibility138 by applying the provisions in amended Rules 702 and 703,139 these courts rely on
“outdated case law”140—often on decisions antedating the 2000
amendments141 and, on occasion, even cases predating Daubert.142
One of the critics’ targets has been the courts’ “uneven administration”143 of the new requirement in Rule 702(d) that the expert
establish that he or she has “reliably applied” the methodology “to
the facts of the case.”144 Admittedly, at common law the courts are
divided over the question of whether the foundation for expert
testimony had to include a showing that the expert had properly
applied the general methodology that he or she proposed relying
on.145 However, the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 definitively settled
that question in federal practice; Rule 702(d) now explicitly
mandates such a showing.146 Yet, as the critics note, in cases such
as City of Pomona v. SQM North America Corp.,147 many courts have
misapplied the provision148 and indicated that the issue of reliable
133. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, EDWARD K. CHENG, JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, ERIN E. MURPHY,
JOSEPH SANDERS & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1:30 (2020); Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 10.
134. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 8.
135. Id. at 22.
136. Id. at 8, 11, 19, 20, 23; Schroeder, supra note 25, at 2046-47, 2059.
137. See Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 25.
138. See Schroeder, supra note 25, at 2043.
139. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 18, 46.
140. Id. at 11; Schroeder, supra note 25, at 2060.
141. Schroeder, supra note 25, at 2045, 2058 (collecting cases); Bernstein & Lasker, supra
note 26, at 8, 21 (collecting cases).
142. See Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 8, 21 (collecting cases).
143. Id. at 9.
144. FED. R. EVID. 702(d).
145. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Debate in the DNA Cases over the Foundation for the
Admission of Scientific Evidence: The Importance of Human Error as a Cause of Forensic
Misanalysis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 19, 23 (1991).
146. FED. R. EVID. 702(d).
147. 750 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2014).
148. See Schroeder, supra note 25, at 2050-52; Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 7, 22,
28-30 (collecting cases).
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application is a weight question149 for the jury150 rather than an
admissibility question the judge must decide as part of his or her
gatekeeping responsibility.151
B. The State of the Jurisprudence on the Specific Topic of the
Factual Bases for Expert Testimony
As the Introduction stated, while this Article necessarily touches
on the general state of expert testimony jurisprudence in federal
court, the primary focus of this Article is much narrower: the
regulation of the “factual” bases for such testimony. Confusion is
especially manifest here. There is confusion in two important respects.
First, there is confusion with respect to the allocation of responsibility for evaluating various aspects of the factual bases for expert
testimony. Two of the Rules seem to expressly assign some decisions
to the judge. Rule 702(b), added by the 2000 amendment, requires
the judge to find that there has been a foundational showing that
“the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data.”152 Moreover,
when the expert contemplates relying on factual information that
is not independently admissible under the hearsay rule, Rule 703
tasks the judge with deciding whether the information in question
is the “kind[ ]” that “experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on ... in forming an opinion on the subject.”153 Yet, in the
face of such mandatory language, the cases are replete with courts’
blanket statements154 to the effect that questions concerning the
credibility,155 soundness,156 weakness,157 or weight158 of the factual

149. Schroeder, supra note 25, at 2058 (collecting cases).
150. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 7.
151. See id. at 36.
152. FED. R. EVID. 702(b).
153. FED. R. EVID. 703.
154. Schroeder, supra note 25, at 2051.
155. Id. at 2045 (collecting cases).
156. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 33 (collecting cases).
157. Id. at 23 (collecting cases); Schroeder, supra note 25, at 2055, 2057 (collecting cases);
Innovation Ventures v. Custom Nutrition Lab’ys L.L.C., 520 F. Supp. 3d 872, 885 (E.D. Mich.
2021).
158. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 23 (collecting cases); Schroeder, supra note 25,
at 2039, 2043, 2054 (collecting cases).
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“underpinnings” of expert testimony are matters for the jury.159 At
the very least these statements are overbroad. Worse still, they are
flatly at odds with the express requirements of the governing
Rules.160
Second—and, as we shall see in Part III, even more importantly—there is confusion in the cases as to what is a “factual”
foundation for an expert opinion.161 Many cases consider two very
different types of information—apples and oranges—under the umbrella of “factual” foundation. Consider a toxic tort case in which the
plaintiff must establish both general and specific causation. To
prove general causation, the plaintiff might call an epidemiologist.162
To investigate the question of whether exposure to a particular
pesticide can cause a certain type of cancer, the epidemiologist
might conduct a cohort study.163 The epidemiologist would collect
facts about the incidence of the disease in both a group exposed to
the pesticide and a group that had not been exposed—facts in the
nature of empirical research data.164 After comparing the facts about
the incidence of the disease in the two groups, the epidemiologist
would reach a conclusion on the general causation question, namely, whether that exposure is capable of causing that type of
cancer.165 That conclusion and the underlying factual information
(the empirical research data) would be relevant in any suit in which
a plaintiff alleged that exposure to that pesticide caused him or her
to develop that type of cancer.166

159. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 33 (citing Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods.
Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2011)); Schroeder, supra note 25, at 2045 (citing Milward,
639 F.3d at 22).
160. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 703.
161. See, e.g., id.
162. See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA L. ROTH, JANE CAMPBELL
MORIARTY & VALENA E. BEETY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, § 2.05[5][b] (6th ed. 2020).
163. See id. § 2.05[5][a], at 2-67.
164. See id.
165. Id. (explaining that the epidemiologist could express the comparison arithmetically
in terms of relative risk (RR), odds ratio (OR), or attributable risk (AR)).
166. In Daubert, the plaintiff alleged that her use of the anti-nausea drug Bendectin during
her pregnancy caused her baby to develop limb deformities. 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993). There
were more than two thousand lawsuits in which other plaintiffs made the same claim about
Bendectin. Peter W. Huber, Science on Trial, CHEMISTRY & INDUS., Aug. 2, 1993, at 604. The
plaintiff relied on epidemiological data to prove general causation in Daubert. That factual
information would have been equally relevant in any of the two thousand lawsuits.
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Of course, to complete his or her case for tort liability, the
plaintiff must also establish specific causation, that is, whether the
exposure caused this plaintiff’s cancer.167 To do so, the plaintiff
could call a physician trained in toxicology. This expert might testify
to a differential etiology analysis, intended to determine the cause
of this plaintiff’s cancer.168 Like the epidemiologist, the toxicologist
would collect factual information to form his or her opinion. More
specifically, the toxicologist might gather reports from nurses,
family members, and other third parties about the symptoms the
plaintiff exhibited. They would provide reports containing factual
information on such questions as whether the plaintiff had bouts of
nausea or dizziness. Both the research data used to prove general
causation and the reports used to establish specific causation are
“factual” in a broad sense; but unlike the research data, these
reports would be relevant only in the lawsuit filed by this plaintiff.
Some courts have treated both types of information as “facts or
data” within the intendment of that expression.169 For instance, in
a leading, pre-Daubert Bendectin case, Richardson v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., the court applied 703, which references “facts or data,”
to general research data, including animal and in vitro studies.170
More recently, in Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc.,
the plaintiff alleged that exposure to benzene can cause acute
promyelocytic leukemia.171 In assessing the sufficiency of the “factual underpinnings” of the expert’s opinion under Rule 702, the
court considered an epidemiological analysis of the famous Bradford
Hill factors172—once again information including general research
data that transcended the plaintiff’s lawsuit and would have been
relevant in any lawsuit in which the plaintiff pressed a similar
claim.173
167. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 4 (AM. L. INST. 2000).
168. See 2 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 162, § 21.50.
169. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of “Facts or Data” in Federal Rule of Evidence
703: The Significance of the Supreme Court’s Decision to Rely on Federal Rule 702 in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 54 MD. L. REV. 352, 360 (1995) (collecting cases).
170. 857 F.2d 823, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
171. 639 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1111 (2012).
172. Schroeder, supra note 25, at 2044-46. The factors are: “the strength, frequency,
consistency, and specificity of the association; the temporal relationship; the dose-response
curve; biological plausibility; coherence of the explanation with generally known factors of the
disease; experimental data; and analogous causal relationships.” See id.
173. See Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 34 (discussing the courts’ consideration of
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Although some courts have interpreted “facts or data” broadly,
other courts construe the language narrowly as being limited to
case-specific information.174 These courts stress that the two types
of facts are fundamentally different.175 It is not only that the factual
information in empirical scientific studies can apply in multiple
cases while, by definition, case-specific information is limited to a
particular lawsuit. More importantly, as Parts III and IV elaborate,
the distinction between the two types of facts relates to the basic
division of labor among judge, jury, and expert under Article VII.176
In designing a division of labor or authority among several parties,
any rational decisionmaker takes into account the relative competencies of the parties. If the question is the significance of the
factual information in a cohort study, an expert epidemiologist is
much more competent to answer that question than a lay juror or
judge. A layperson would find the information at the very least
perplexing. However, if the question is the credibility of information about a particular patient’s symptoms such as nausea or dizziness, the question falls squarely within the province of the lay
trier of fact.177 That is the sort of question that laypersons in jury
trials and lay judges at bench trials routinely resolve.178
That insight becomes central in Parts III and IV. Part III explains why the sounder interpretation of “facts or data” in Article
VII is that the expression means only case-specific information.
Concededly, “data” is an expansive term; and scientists often refer
to their “data.” However, on reflection, considering the text, context,
and legislative history of Rule 703 in particular, the narrow
interpretation emerges as the better view.179 And since Rules 702(b)
and 705 use identical language, the interpretation of that language
in Rule 703 informs the construction of Rules 702 and 705.180 Part
general empirical studies in assessing the sufficiency of the opinion’s factual support under
Rule 702); see also Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic
Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. L.
REV. 643, 668 (1992).
174. See Imwinkelried, supra note 169, at 360.
175. Id. at 361.
176. See FED. R. EVID. 701-06, 801.
177. See Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 45-46.
178. See id.
179. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
180. FED. R. EVID. 703, 702(b), 705.
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IV then explains why, positing that narrow interpretation, Rules
702, 703, and 705 can function as a coherent, sensible scheme for
regulating the “factual” bases of expert testimony.
III. DRILLING DOWN TO THE KEY INTERPRETIVE ISSUE:
THE MEANING OF “FACTS OR DATA” IN FEDERAL RULES
702(B), 703, AND 705
To appreciate the nature and importance of the language, “facts
or data,” in Rules 702, 703, and 705, we need to drill down through
three levels of the law of expert testimony: the permissible uses of
a witness who happens to be an expert, the essential components of
the reasoning of an expert who offers an opinion about the facts in
the case, and finally the provisions that govern the component
specifying the case-specific facts that the opinion is premised on.
A. The First Level: The Four Permissible Uses of a Witness Who
Happens to Be an Expert
Courts and commentators frequently refer to the “use” of expert
witnesses as if there is only one way to press such witnesses into
service at trial. In truth, there are four different ways in which such
witnesses can be used.181 Consider a witness who is a toxicologist.
Assume that the witness is driving to work one morning and
observes a traffic accident at an intersection. More specifically, she
sees a blue car run through a red light and collide with a yellow car
which had a green light. The witness has firsthand, personal
knowledge that the blue car went through the red light and
smashed into the yellow car. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 602,
she can testify to those observed facts.182 The witness may be a
distinguished, eminently qualified toxicologist; but that does not
disqualify her from testifying to observed facts. Like a layperson
with no background in toxicology, she is competent to give that
testimony under Rule 602.183
181. 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, GEORGE E. DIX, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, DAVID H. KAYE &
ELEANOR SWIFT, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 98-100 (Robert P. Mosteller ed., 8th ed. 2020)
[hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE].
182. See FED. R. EVID. 602.
183. See id.
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Now assume further that immediately after the collision, she
exits her car, approaches the badly damaged blue car, and talks to
the driver who has just exited the blue car. She observes that he is
stumbling, his speech is incoherent, and he reeks of alcohol. At
common law, based on such observations, a layperson could not only
describe those observations; the lay witness could also opine that
the person was intoxicated.184 As at common law, the opinion is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 701.185 A layperson with no
background in toxicology could offer that lay opinion, and it is
equally permissible for the toxicologist to do so.
Take a further step. After the collision, the driver of the yellow
car sues the driver of the blue car for compensation for personal
injury and property damage. At the trial of the lawsuit, the police
officer who investigated the accident has already taken the stand.
The officer testifies to administering an infrared breath test186 to
the driver of the blue car. The officer adds that when the driver blew
into the device, the output gave a digital display of 0.13 percent
alcohol, a reading that under state law supports an inference of
intoxication.187 The next witness is the toxicologist. The plaintiff’s
attorney elicits the toxicologist’s testimony about the general reliability of infrared breath testing devices. The attorney is content
with that testimony; the attorney does not ask the witness to apply
their expertise to testify to an expert opinion as to whether, given
the 0.13 percent reading, the driver of the blue car was intoxicated.
The wording of Rule 702 is pertinent here; the Rule allows experts
to “testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”188 Initially, the
wording, “or otherwise,” might appear strange; but the Advisory
Committee Note accompanying Rule 702 explains:
Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only in the
form of opinions. The assumption is logically unfounded. The
rule accordingly recognizes that an expert on the stand may give
a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 181, § 11, at 23.
See FED. R. EVID. 701.
See 2 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 162, § 22.03[3][b], at 22-50.
Id. § 22.08[3].
FED. R. EVID. 702.
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relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the
facts.189

In this variation of the hypothetical, the expert has done precisely
that. The witness has testified in an expert capacity but limited her
testimony to a general “principle[ ],” that is, the reliability of
infrared breath testing devices.190 The expert may confine her
testimony to a general discussion of an expert methodology. That
testimony is admissible even if the witness does not utter a word
about the specific facts of the case or venture an expert opinion as
to the sobriety of the driver of the blue car.
Although an expert may give the sort of limited testimony described in the preceding paragraph, “[i]n the overwhelming majority
of cases” the proponent invites the expert to go further.191 The
proponent wants the expert to take the next step; the proponent
asks the expert to apply that methodology to the facts of the case
and thereby form an opinion about the significance of one or more
of the facts of the case. That is why the quoted phrase in Rule 702
begins with the wording, “in the form of an opinion.”192 As we see in
Section B, when the expert testifies in this manner, the expert’s
reasoning has several distinct components.
B. The Second Level: The Essential Components of the Reasoning
of an Expert Who Testifies About the Significance of the Facts
in the Case
Of course, to give any expert testimony, in the words of Rule 702,
the witness must be “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education.”193 Suppose that at the beginning
of her direct examination, the witness testifies to the credentials
qualifying her as an expert. Now assume that in the instant case,
the proponent wants the expert to testify in the typical manner,
namely, deriving an opinion by applying a general methodology to
one or more of the specific facts of the case. In that event, the
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules.
See id.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 181, § 12, at 99.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
Id.

748

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:719

structure of the witness’s testimony will be somewhat similar to
that of a syllogism.194 A classic syllogism consists of a major
premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion.195 The content of the
typical expert’s testimony is analogous.196 If we dissect the expert’s
reasoning process, the expert testifies on four distinct topics: (1) the
reliability of the general methodology that they propose to rely on;197
(2) the case-specific facts they contemplate applying the methodology to;198 (3) the application of the methodology to those facts;199
and (4) the final conclusion or opinion derived by applying the
methodology to the facts.200 By way of example, a psychiatrist could
derive an opinion about a testator’s mental competence by applying
some general diagnostic criteria to the testator’s case history.201 Or
a DNA expert might form an opinion about a perpetrator’s genetic
profile by applying the Short Tandem Repeat (STR) typing technique to a blood stain discovered at the crime scene.202
Consider the various components. The first component functions
much like a major premise. This component consists of what Rule
702(c) describes as the “reliable principles and methods” that the
expert employs.203 Daubert speaks to this component.204 In that case,
the Court reviewed the adequacy of the empirical validation for the
general proposition that a pregnant woman’s ingestion of Bendectin
in her first trimester can cause certain sorts of limb defects in her
baby.205
The second component serves a purpose similar to that of a minor
premise in a classic syllogism.206 To derive an opinion about the

194. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Educational Significance of the Syllogistic Structure
of Expert Testimony, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1148, 1149-50 (1993); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
“Bases” of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV.
1, 2-3 (1989) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, “Bases” of Expert Testimony].
195. Imwinkelried, “Bases” of Expert Testimony, supra note 194, at 2-3.
196. Id.
197. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 181, § 13.
198. Id. § 14.
199. Id. § 15.
200. Id. § 16.
201. See id. §§ 12, 14.
202. 2 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 162, § 18.03[5][a], at 18-41.
203. FED. R. EVID. 702(c).
204. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
205. Id. at 582-85.
206. See Imwinkelried, “Bases” of Expert Testimony, supra note 194, at 2-3.
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significance of certain facts in the case, the expert must make
certain assumptions about the case-specific facts. Modernly, it is
permissible for the expert to do so if: the expert has personal
knowledge of the facts; the facts are posed to the expert in a proper hypothetical question; or the expert has received a certain type
of out-of-court report about the fact.207
The next step in the expert’s reasoning process is component (3).
As previously stated, at common law there was a division of authority whether the foundation for expert testimony required a showing
of proper test procedure.208 Today, Federal Rule 702(d) is dispositive.209 By its terms, that provision requires that the proponent show
that “the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case.”210 Thus, in the above DNA example, the expert
would not only have to testify that he or she utilized the generally
reliable STR typing methodology; the expert would also have to
vouch that they had followed the accepted procedure for employing
STR.211
The last component of the expert’s reasoning is the statement of
the opinion itself. Both at common law and under the Federal Rules,
there are restrictions on the opinion’s wording. For instance, at
common law, at one time many courts forbade experts from opining
on “ultimate” issues in the case.212 Although Federal Rule 704(a)
overturns the ultimate issue prohibition, Rule 704(b) states:
In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion
about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state
or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or
of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.213

With this structure in mind, we can revisit the question that the
Introduction identified as the primary focus of this Article: What
Federal Rules provisions govern judicial regulation of the “factual” bases of expert testimony? If by that expression we mean the
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 181, § 14.
Imwinkelried, supra note 145, at 21-22.
FED. R. EVID. 702(d).
Id.
2 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 162, § 18.05[3][a], at 18-119.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 181, § 16.
FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
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case-specific facts serving as the expert’s minor premise, which
provisions control? To answer that question, we must drill down
to the third level.
C. The Third Level: The Federal Rules Provisions Controlling
Which Types of Information the Expert May Include in His or
Her Minor Premise Assumptions About the Facts of the Case
Assume that at the first level, the proponent is using the expert
in the typical fashion, asking the expert to derive an opinion by applying a general expert methodology to certain case-specific facts.
Assume further that at the second level, the opponent makes the
expert’s minor premise (the expert’s assumption about the casespecific facts) the point of attack. As Part II demonstrated, there is
considerable confusion in the cases over the regulation of the factual bases of expert opinions. The critical, third question then becomes which Federal Rule provisions the judge should apply in
order to determine what information the expert may include in his
or her minor premise. Of course, the words “facts or data” immediately come to mind—the language that currently appears once in
Rule 702, twice in Rule 705, and thrice in Rule 703.214
1. The Meaning of “Facts or Data” in Rule 703
As previously stated, under the original version of the Federal
Rules, the courts divided over the question of whether they should
look to Rule 703 or elsewhere to decide which information the expert
may consider about the facts that the expert is applying the general
methodology to.215 Some courts suggested that that was at least not
the sole function of Rule 703 and that “facts or data” in Rule 703
included empirical research data supporting the validity of the
expert’s general methodology.216 As the Introduction stated, though,
the better view is that the reference to “facts or data” in 703 means
only case-specific factual information.217 The text of the Rule, its
context, and its legislative history all point to that conclusion.
214.
215.
216.
217.

FED. R. EVID. 702, 705, 703.
Imwinkelried, supra note 29, at 451-57; Imwinkelried, supra note 169, at 355-56.
Imwinkelried, supra note 169, at 360; Imwinkelried, supra note 29, at 452-54.
See FED. R. EVID. 703.
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Initially, consider the text of Rule 703. As Part I noted, the
original and 2000 versions of Rule 703 alluded to “[t]he facts or data
in the particular case.”218 When the Rule was restyled in 2011, that
language was changed to “facts or data in the case”; but the accompanying Advisory Committee Note stated that the linguistic
change was not intended to effect any substantive change.219 The
popular, dictionary meaning of “particular” is “relating to a single
person or thing.”220 In studies designed to validate general expert
methodologies, scientists collect factual empirical information; but
that information would be relevant in any case in which an expert
employs the same methodology.221 As previously stated, there were
over two thousand Bendectin lawsuits.222 The epidemiological data
that the plaintiffs proffered in Daubert was factual in a broad sense,
but it was not “particular” or peculiar to that lawsuit by any stretch
of the imagination.223
Like the text of Rule 703, its context lends support to the narrow
construction of “facts or data” in 703. Rule 703 must be interpreted
in light of and harmonized with the other provisions in Article VII,
such as Rules 702 and 705. As Part I noted, the original version of
Rule 702 did not contain the current Rule 702(b) requiring foundational proof that “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or
data.”224 The contrast between the original version of the two Rules
was stark. Rule 702 contained no language explicitly or impliedly
limiting the “scientific ... knowledge” to information specific to the
particular case.225 Again, in Daubert the question was the validity
of the general proposition that a pregnant woman’s ingestion of Bendectin during the first trimester could cause certain types of limb
defects in her baby.226 When the question was the validity of that
proposition, the Daubert Court looked to Rule 702, not 703; when
the Court described the trial judge’s gatekeeping responsibility to

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment.
Imwinkelried, supra note 29, at 454.
See, e.g., id. at 451.
Huber, supra note 166, at 604.
See Imwinkelried, supra note 29, at 451.
FED. R. EVID. 702(b).
Id.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993).
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screen out unreliable theories and techniques, the Court declared
that “[t]he primary locus of this obligation is Rule 702.”227
The context of Rule 705 sheds even more light on the proper
interpretation of “facts or data” in Rule 703. As Part I pointed out,
throughout its history Rule 705 has allowed an expert on direct to
state an “opinion” and the “reasons” for the opinion “without first
testifying to the underlying facts or data.”228 Initially, posit the
broad view that “facts or data” includes even empirical research
data validating general scientific hypotheses and methodologies.
Again, in Daubert, the battleground was over the validity of the
hypothesis of a causal nexus between maternal Bendectin use and
limb defects in babies.229 The Court reviewed the empirical data (in
vitro test tube experiments, in vivo live animal studies, and
epidemiological data) that the plaintiffs proffered to validate that
hypothesis.230 If “facts or data” in Rule 705 included all the research
data and Rule 705 allowed the expert to withhold all that data,
what could the expert’s proponent do on direct? The expert’s
proponent could be content to elicit this testimony: “I’m an epidemiologist, I conducted an epidemiological study, and my opinion is
that a mother’s use of Bendectin in the first trimester can cause
limb defects in their babies.”231 By unduly expanding the scope of
the expression “facts or data,” the broad view drains “reasons” of
virtually all its content.232 The result would be a direct examination
that is conclusory in the extreme.233 Tellingly, in both Kumho and
Joiner the Court cautioned lower courts that an expert’s “ipse dixit”
pronouncements do not satisfy Daubert.234
Contrast what the expert’s direct would look like if the judge
enforced the narrow interpretation of “facts or data.” To be sure, the
expert could still withhold the case-specific facts about the frequency of Mrs. Daubert’s use of the drug and her symptoms.
However, the expert would have to elaborate on the empirical
227. Id. at 589.
228. FED. R. EVID. 705.
229. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.
230. Id. at 582-83.
231. See Imwinkelried, supra note 29, at 455.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 157 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
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research data that the expert claims validated the hypothesis of a
causal connection.235 The upshot is that the jury would be in a much
better position to make an intelligent decision whether to accept the
expert’s opinion.236 Rule 702(a) imposes the requirement that expert
testimony must “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue.”237 On several occasions, Professor
Ronald Allen has made the salient point that in order to satisfy
that requirement, the courts should construe Article VII in a way
that forces the expert to educate the jury about substantive merit of
the proffered testimony.238 The narrow interpretation of “facts or
data” provides much better assurance that the expert testimony
submitted to it will actually educate the jury and enable them to
make an intelligent, independent decision.239
Finally, the extrinsic legislative history of Rule 703 also provides
powerful support for the narrow interpretation. Two passages in the
Advisory Committee Note are pertinent. In one passage, the Note
furnishes examples of the appropriate scope of “facts or data” under
the Rule—a patient’s statement that he experienced pain, a report
by a relative that the patient complained of pain, a hospital record
quoting the patient’s complaint about pain, or an X-ray showing
the possible cause of the pain.240 All of the Committee’s examples
are case-specific facts, not the sort of empirical research data employed to validate proposed general methodologies.241
In another passage, the Note makes it clear that the Rule’s real innovation is its grant of permission to experts to rely on secondhand,
out-of-court reports in addition to personally observed facts and the
facts stated in hypothetical questions.242 At common law, most
jurisdictions restricted experts to reliance on firsthand knowledge
and hypothetical questions.243 In crafting Rule 703, the drafters
235. See Imwinkelried, supra note 29, at 448-49.
236. See id. at 455.
237. FED. R. EVID. 702(a).
238. Ronald J. Allen, Fiddling While Rome Burns: The Story of the Federal Rules and
Experts, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1551, 1552-53, 1556 (2018). See generally Ronald J. Allen &
Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L.
REV. 1131 (1993).
239. See Imwinkelried, supra note 29, at 455.
240. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on proposed rules.
241. See id.
242. Id.
243. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 181, § 14.
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intended to create a new, more workable alternative to the oftencriticized hypothetical question.244
First, assume the narrow view of the scope of “facts or data.”
Positing that assumption and further assuming that secondhand
reports and hypothetical questions apply to the same types of facts,
in Daubert the plaintiff’s attorney might pose the following hypothetical question to an epidemiologist:
Professor, I want you to assume the following facts. (1) Mrs.
Daubert regularly ingested an anti-nausea drug during her first
trimester. (2) That drug was Bendectin. (3) Jason Daubert was
born as a result of that pregnancy. And (4) at the time of birth,
Jason’s limbs were deformed. Based on those facts, do you have
an opinion as to the cause of Jason’s limb defects?245

Each element of the hypothesis relates to a case-specific fact. Just
as those facts would be appropriate subjects for secondhand, out-ofcourt reports, they are suitable for inclusion in a hypothetical
question.
Alternatively, assume the broad reading of “facts or data,” the
interpretation that expands its scope to include empirical research
data. Positing that interpretation, the plaintiff’s attorney might
add another element to the hypothesis posed to the expert: “Epidemiological studies show that there is a statistically significant
relationship between maternal use of Bendectin and birth defects.”246 Under the broad view, this phrasing is unobjectionable
because, like the specific facts stated in (1)-(4), this research data
falls into the category of “facts or data.” It is submitted, though, that
“[a]ny judge in her right mind would sustain an objection to that
phrasing.”247 It is the epidemiologist’s province to tell the court,
including the attorney calling the expert, what the empirical
epidemiological data shows; it is not the attorney’s role to tell the
epidemiologist what the epidemiological data shows.248 By adding
element (5) to the hypothesis, the attorney has attempted to reverse

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on proposed rule.
Imwinkelried, supra note 29, at 456.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see Imwinkelried, supra note 169, at 372.
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the roles of expert and attorney—an absurd outcome.249 If the
attorney wants to make that assertion in open court in the jury’s
hearing, the attorney should withdraw from the case, take the
stand, qualify as an expert, and then attempt to defend the
assertion.
2. The Meaning of “Facts or Data” in Rules 702 and 705
The narrow interpretation of “facts or data” in Rule 703, limiting
the expression to case-specific data, is clearly the preferable reading of that Rule. As we have repeatedly noted, the identical language appears in Rules 702(b) and 705.250 Given the above analysis
of the construction of Rule 703, it is a small step to conclude that the
courts ought to ascribe the same, limited meaning to the language
in those Rules. Part I cited the hoary interpretive maxim that when
the drafters use the same language in different statutes in the same
legislative scheme, the courts ought to presume that they intended
the language to be construed identically in all the statutes.251 Part
I pointed out that that maxim is not only generally sensible but also
that the maxim has special force here.252 The drafters carefully
scrutinized the wording of the Federal Rules; that wording was a
product of seven years of deliberation by Judicial Conference bodies
and two years of congressional study.253 Further, Rules 702, 703,
and 705 took effect at the same time.254 In addition, they all relate
to the same core policy objective of ensuring the reliability of expert
testimony.255 Finally, they are proximate provisions not only in the
same Article of the Federal Rules but, in the case of Rules 702 and
703, immediately adjacent provisions.256 It defies reason to think
that the drafters did not want the language construed the same way
in the three Rules.

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See Imwinkelried, supra note 169, at 372.
FED. R. EVID. 702, 703, 705.
See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
See FED. R. EVID. 702, 703, 705.
See id.
See id.
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IV. USING THIS INTERPRETATION TO CLARIFY THE JUDICIAL
REGULATION OF THE FACTUAL BASES FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY
The objective of this Article is to contribute to ending the current
confusion over regulation of the “factual” bases or underpinnings
of expert testimony. Once we commit to a narrow interpretation of
the expression “facts or data” in Article VII, we can use that key
interpretation to largely banish that confusion. Part II.B pointed out
that numerous opinions state the broad generalization that it is the
jury’s province to assess the factual bases or underpinnings of
expert testimony.257 As we shall now see, that generalization is only
partially true. The broad topic of regulation of factual bases of
expert opinions raises three more specific issues about the division
of authority or labor among judge, jury, and expert: Can the judge
pass on the credibility of the “facts or data” underlying the expert’s
opinion? Qualitatively, does the judge or the expert determine which
“kinds” of “facts or data” the expert may factor into their minor
premise?258 And, quantitatively, does the judge or jury decide the
sufficiency of the “facts or data” to support the expert’s opinion?259
Despite the confusion in the cases,260 if we embrace the narrow
interpretation of “facts or data,” the answer to each question is relatively straightforward.
A. Who Has Final Authority to Decide the Credibility of the
“Facts or Data” Underlying the Expert’s Opinion—the Jury or
the Judge?
As the preceding paragraph observed, adopting the narrow interpretation of “facts or data” is central to resolving the three questions
about the factual bases of the expert’s opinion. That observation
certainly holds true for the question of who has final authority to
decide the credibility of the testimony comprising the expert’s minor
premise about the “facts or data” in the case.

257.
258.
259.
260.

See supra Part II.B.
Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 18, 46.
Id. at 18, 31, 33, 46.
Id. at 31, 33; Schroeder, supra note 25, at 2041.
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Suppose that the courts adopted the broad view that “facts or
data” extends to empirical scientific data relevant to the validation
of the expert’s methodology or hypothesis. As previously stated, in
Daubert the plaintiffs proffered such evidence to validate the hypothesis of a causal nexus between maternal Bendectin use and the
birth of babies with limb deformities.261 The Court expressly declared that when the judge is deciding whether the proponent’s
foundational testimony has validated the relevant hypothesis, Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) governs.262 The Advisory Committee
Note to 104(a) states that when the judge rules on 104(a), “the judge
acts as a trier of fact.... [T]he judge will of necessity receive evidence
pro and con.”263 In this setting, the judge may consider the credibility of the testimony.264
However, Part III demonstrated that the narrower interpretation
of “facts or data” is preferable. On that assumption, the jury—not
the judge—is the final arbiter of the credibility of the testimony. The
jury’s final authority becomes evident once we consider the three
forms that the information about the case-specific facts can take
under Rule 703: the expert’s personal observation, third parties’
testimony to facts specified in a hypothetical question posed to the
expert, or the expert’s reliance on third parties’ secondhand reports
in some circumstances.265 Consider the sources one by one.
If the witness purports to have observed the fact, such as when a
physician testifies that she saw the patient’s lesion, Rule 602
governs the admissibility of her testimony to the observation.266
Rule 602 incorporates the 104(b) standard.267 Under 104(b), the
judge makes a limited legal sufficiency determination; the judge
decides only whether the proponent’s foundational testimony is
“sufficient to support a finding that” the witness observed the fact
or event.268 The judge asks this question: If the jury decides to
believe the testimony, is its facial probative value sufficient to

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 583 (1993).
Id. at 592.
FED. R. EVID. 104(a) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules.
See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 69.
See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 181, § 14.
See FED. R. EVID. 602.
FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
FED. R. EVID. 104(b), 602.
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support a rational finding that the witness observed the event?269 It
is not just that the jury is competent to make the final decision on
such questions. Moreover, submitting that question to the jury does
not imperil the integrity of the eventual jury deliberation. If during
deliberation the juror finds that the witness lacked personal knowledge and “doesn’t know what he’s talking about,”270 common sense
will naturally lead the juror to disregard the testimony in the
balance of the deliberations.
The same analysis obtains when the proponent uses the device of
a hypothetical question to provide the expert with the assumptions
about the case-specific facts. Typically, before permitting the hypothetical question, the judge demands that the proponent call other
witnesses to testify that they have personal knowledge of the fact or
event later mentioned in the hypothesis.271 When those prior
witnesses attempt to testify to the facts or events they observed,
again Rule 602 controls. The judge makes a limited legal sufficiency
determination. The jury ultimately assesses the credibility of the
testimony and decides whether to believe the testimony about the
hypothesized fact.
Finally, consider secondhand reports. As previously stated, the
innovative aspect of Rule 703 is that unlike the common law, Rule
703 allows experts to rely on secondhand, out-of-court reports when
“experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds
of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject.”272 The original
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 703 explained the drafters’ intent:
[T]o bring the judicial practice into line with the practice of the
experts themselves when not in court. Thus a physician in his
own practice bases his diagnosis on information from numerous
sources and of considerable variety, including statements by
patients and relatives, reports and opinions from nurses,
technicians and other doctors.273

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 69.
See CARLSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 95.
See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 181, § 14.
FED. R. EVID. 703.
FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note to 1972 amendment.
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It is true that under the third sentence of Rule 703, “the proponent
of the opinion” ordinarily may not disclose the content of the
secondhand report to the jury if the report does not independently
qualify under the hearsay rule.274 However, if the opponent believes
that the report possesses minimal credibility, the opponent can
expose the report during cross-examination. As the Advisory
Committee Note to the 2000 amendment states, “Nothing in this
Rule restricts the presentation of underlying facts or data when
offered by an adverse party” as on cross-examination.275 The opponent may use both cross-examination and extrinsic testimony to
attack the report’s believability. Then, during closing argument, the
opponent can ask the jury to disbelieve and discount the report. And
if it is obvious or the expert conceded that the truth of the report is
an essential premise of the expert’s opinion, the opponent can urge
the jury to reject the opinion itself.
In his concurrence in one of the leading pre-Daubert expert
testimony cases, Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., Chief Judge
Clark presented a persuasive statutory construction argument for
denying the judge the power to pass on the credibility of secondhand
reports.276 In that case, one of the questions was whether the decedent had been exposed to a lethal level of cadmium and nickel
fumes.277 The plaintiff’s expert relied on a coemployee’s affidavit describing the level and duration of the decedent’s exposure. The majority dismissed the affidavit as stating “grossly inaccurate dosage
or duration data.”278 Chief Judge Clark criticized the majority’s assessment of the credibility of the testimony, stressing that Rule 703
authorized the judge to decide only whether the general “type” of
information is the type that experts in his or her field reasonably
rely on.279 In the Chief Judge’s mind, that statutory language sent
a clear signal that the judge may not go further and assess the
credibility of the specific secondhand report the expert is relying

274. FED. R. EVID. 703.
275. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
276. See 939 F.2d 1106, 1116-23 (5th Cir. 1991) (Clark, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 912 (1992).
277. Id. at 1108 (majority opinion).
278. Id. at 1114.
279. Id. at 1118 (Clark, C.J., concurring). The restyled Rule 703 changes the term from
“type” to “kinds.” FED. R. EVID. 703.
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on.280 Because under 703 secondhand reports are simply an alternative to testimony about personally observed facts and hypothetical questions and Rule 602 governs the latter alternatives,
Chief Judge Clark is right; and all three types of information are
treated consistently.
The denouement is that on this aspect of the opinion’s “factual”
basis, the generalization holds true; the jury has the authority to
make the final decision on credibility. However, as previously
stated, there are two other related questions. The opponent has
occasion to mount a credibility attack in the jury’s hearing only if
the judge rules that the expert’s opinion is admissible. If the judge
excludes the opinion, the issue is moot; the jury will not hear either
the expert’s opinion or the supporting testimony about the expert’s
minor premise. The remaining two issues relate directly to the
preceding admissibility determination.
B. Who Has the Final Authority to Decide Whether the
Secondhand Report That Serves as the Expert’s Minor Premise
Is “the Kind” That “Experts in the Particular Field Would
Reasonably Rely on ... in Forming an Opinion on the
Subject”—the Judge or the Expert?
The admissibility ruling has a qualitative dimension.281 Suppose
that the expert is relying on a secondhand, out-of-court report that
does not qualify for admission as substantive evidence under the
hearsay rule. Nevertheless, the second sentence of Rule 703 allows
the expert to premise an opinion on the report “[i]f experts in the
particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject.”282 When we reach this
issue, the generalization that the jury decides the factual underpinnings of the opinion breaks down badly. As we shall see, the choice
for final arbiter on this question is either the judge or the expert.
Once again assume that the courts embraced the broad interpretation of “facts or data” in Rule 703. Given that assumption, there
would be a strong case that the final authority ought to be assigned

280. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1118 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
281. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 18, 46.
282. FED. R. EVID. 703.

2022]

(PARTIAL) CLARITY: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

761

to the expert. The judge would arguably have to defer to the expert’s
choice and could not override the expert’s selection of a particular
type of data as the basis for the expert’s opinion. Prior to Daubert,
most jurisdictions adhered to the Frye standard for determining the
admissibility of scientific testimony.283 According to Frye, a scientific methodology could serve as a basis for courtroom testimony
only if it had “gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.”284 The prevailing sentiment in the pertinent
expert fields was not only relevant; it was dispositive. The Frye line
of authority gave experts the “determinative” because the courts
argued that experts were more “qualified [than judges or jurors] to
assess the general validity of a scientific method.”285 If “facts or
data” subsumed empirical research data, a similar argument could
be made here.
However, as Part III explained, the better view is that “facts or
data” is strictly limited to case-specific factual information and does
not encompass the sort of empirical research data that the Daubert
Court reviewed. Nevertheless, the cases are divided over the question of the final authority to decide the qualitative question; early
on, some courts took the so-called liberal position that the expert’s
choice was dispositive.286 In effect, these courts equated “reasonably”
in 703’s second sentence with “customarily.”287 The courts routinely
applied Rule 104(a) to this determination; if the expert vouched that
it was the customary practice in his or her field to consider a certain
type of information and the judge found that testimony credible, the
judge’s hands were tied. The judge had to allow the expert to factor
283. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see 1 GIANNELLI ET AL.,
supra note 162, § 1.08.
284. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
285. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also People v.
Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (Mich. 1977) (“[E]xperts know most about a procedure to
experiment and to study it. In effect, they form a kind of technical jury.”). Although Daubert
held as a matter of statutory construction that Frye was no longer good law in federal
practice, even the Daubert Court listed general acceptance as a relevant factor in the judge’s
admissibility analysis. 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). General acceptance can be relevant
circumstantial evidence of the methodology’s empirical validity. If a methodology has been in
circulation for years and managed to garner widespread acceptance, a number of experts in
the field have presumably reviewed the underlying empirical data and found it to be
satisfactory support.
286. Imwinkelried, supra note 29, at 466-67 (collecting cases).
287. Id. at 466.
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that type of information into the expert’s minor premise even if the
judge had grave doubts about the trustworthiness of information
from that type of source.
However, there is a competing restrictive view that is both
sensible and superior as a matter of statutory interpretation. In a
sense, this question is analogous to the problem of customary
practice in negligence law in torts.288 Suppose that the question is
whether a particular industrial or manufacturing practice is negligent. On the one hand, to decide that question, the judge will admit testimony that the practice is customary in that industry. The
widespread acceptance of the practice by the persons most familiar
with the field is some relevant evidence that the practice is
prudent.289 On the other hand, the courts do not give the custom
dispositive weight. When the terms of the rule of law refer to
“reasonable”—not “customary”—there is a connotation that the
courts are to apply an objective standard and not automatically approve the industry’s practice. Similarly, as some courts have held,
in deciding whether it is reasonable for an expert to rely on a
particular “kind” or “type” of secondhand report, it is relevant that
in the expert’s field it is a customary practice to do so. These courts
give the experts’ customary practice “due regard.”290 If the expert’s
testimony is convincing, the court may treat the testimony as
“strong evidence” of reasonableness.291 Some courts have even gone
to the length of holding that proof of the existence of the custom
raises a rebuttable presumption of objective reasonableness under
Rule 703.292 However, in the final analysis, since the term of the
evidentiary rule is “reasonable”—not “customary”—the judge retains a residual discretion to second-guess the experts’ practice.293
The restrictive view is not only sounder as a matter of policy; it is
also superior as a matter of statutory construction. As in Part III.B,
the contextual argument carries the day.294 The context includes
Rules 406 and 803(17). Rule 406 deals with evidence of “a person’s
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. at 467-68.
See FED. R. EVID. 401.
Epps, supra note 108, at 61.
Id. at 78, 81.
See, e.g., Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 579 A.2d 1241, 1247 (N.J. 1990).
Epps, supra note 108, at 78.
See Imwinkelried, supra note 29, at 467-68.
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habit or an organization’s routine practice.”295 For its part, Rule
803(17) carves out a hearsay exception for “[m]arket quotations,
lists, directories, or other compilations that are generally relied on
... by persons in particular occupations.”296 When the drafters
wanted to make a customary or routine practice controlling, they
knew how to find apt language to manifest that precise intent.
Given the careful examination of the wording of the Federal Rules—
seven years of study in the Judicial Conference followed by two
years of congressional deliberation—the inclusion of the adverb
“reasonably” in Rule 703 is persuasive.
C. Who Has Final Authority to Decide Whether the Case-Specific
Information Contained in the Expert’s Minor Premise Includes
“Sufficient Facts or Data” to Support the Expert’s Opinion—the
Judge or the Jury?
There is a quantitative aspect to the admissibility decision.297
Here, too, the generalization that questions relating to the expert
opinion’s factual bases are matters for the jury breaks down. It is
justifiable for Federal Rule 702(b) to task the judge with ruling
whether the expert’s opinion “is based on sufficient facts or data.”298
Although the jury passes on the credibility of the underlying casespecific testimony when the judge rules the opinion admissible, as
a general proposition the judge has an overarching responsibility to
protect against irrational determinations by a jury. Concededly, to
an extent in criminal cases, we tolerate irrational jury factfinding
during the final deliberation by permitting the jury to return a
general verdict; occasionally, a general verdict serves to shield jury
nullification from public scrutiny.
However, until we reach that stage in criminal cases the judge
enjoys considerable power to keep the jury’s decision-making within the range of rationality. Rules 104(b), 602, and 901 are illustrative: Rule 104(b) sets out a lax general standard that the later Rules
apply to determinations of a witness’s personal knowledge (Rule

295.
296.
297.
298.

FED. R. EVID. 406.
FED. R. EVID. 803(17).
Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 26, at 18, 31, 33, 46.
FED. R. EVID. 702(b).
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602) and an exhibit’s authenticity (Rule 901).299 Although the Rule
104(b) standard is a low bar, a lay witness’s testimony about an
alleged perceived fact or event is submissible to the jury only if the
judge finds that the facial probative value of the foundational
testimony is “sufficient to support a finding that” the witness saw
and recalls the fact or event.300 Likewise, the proponent may submit
a purported author’s letter to the jury only if, on its face, the
foundational testimony is “sufficient to support a finding that” the
purported author wrote the letter.301 If the foundational testimony
falls short of even Rule 104(b)’s minimal standard, it would be
irrational for the jury to conclude that the witness saw the accident
or that the purported author wrote the letter.
The judge’s power to prevent irrational jury behavior is not only
manifest in the microcosm of the treatment of individual items of
evidence; it is also evident in the macrocosm of the decision whether
to allow the case to go to the jury. With respect to every element of
the plaintiff’s or prosecutor’s prima facie case, the judge assigns the
proponent an initial burden of production going forward.302 To
satisfy that burden, a civil litigant must present enough testimony
to support a permissive inference that the alleged fact existed or
that the alleged event occurred.303 Just as the judge passes on the
legal sufficiency of the foundational testimony under Rule 104(b),
the judge makes a legal sufficiency determination when, at the end
of the plaintiff’s or prosecutor’s case-in-chief, the defense moves for
a directed verdict or judgment of acquittal as a matter of law. The
thrust of the motion is a contention that, even if the jurors choose
to believe all the testimony presented in the case-in-chief, it would
be irrational for them to make a finding in favor of the burdened
party.304 If the judge believes that contention is correct, the judge
299.
300.
301.
302.

FED. R. EVID. 104(b), 602, 901.
FED. R. EVID. 104(b), 602.
FED. R. EVID. 104(b), 901.
2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, PAUL C. GIANNELLI, FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN, FREDRIC I.
LEDERER & LIESA RICHTER, COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 2903 (6th ed. 2016).
303. Id. § 2904. In criminal cases, to protect the preeminent value of liberty, Jackson v.
Virginia prescribes a higher standard. 443 U.S. 307, 319, 324 (1979). The judge must conclude
that the prosecution’s evidence is sufficient to permit a rational, hypothetical juror to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the fact existed or the event occurred. IMWINKELRIED ET AL.,
supra note 302, § 2919.
304. See IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 302, § 2905.
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precludes an irrational jury finding by making a peremptory ruling
in favor of the defendant.305 For that matter, even in a criminal case,
if the defense fails to present sufficient evidence to support a defense, the judge may refuse to instruct on the defense in the final
jury charge.306
Rule 702(b)’s mandate that the judge find that “sufficient” facts
support the expert’s opinion is not an anomaly; rather, it is simply
another facet of the judge’s power to guard against irrational jury
decision-making.307 Suppose that in a trial relating to a traffic accident, the plaintiff calls an accident reconstruction expert to opine
about the speed at which the defendant was driving. As his major
premise, the expert relies on one of the recognized formulae for
estimating speed from physical evidence such as the length of
skidmarks.308 Assume further that the expert proposes relying on a
particular formula with a variable for drag factor.309 The drag factor depends on considerations such as the type of road surface, the
dry or wet condition of the surface, and the vehicle’s braking
system.310 In voir dire by the defense counsel, the plaintiff’s expert
concedes that he did not bother to learn anything about the type of
surface at the site of the accident, the weather conditions, or the
defendant’s vehicle’s braking system. He admits that rather than
going to that trouble, he “ballparked” the drag factor value to insert
as the variable in the formula. If the expert’s source for the casespecific information is nothing more than a guess, the flimsiness of
the opinion’s factual basis should render it inadmissible;311 it would
be irrational for the jury to make a factual finding based on nothing
more than the expert’s speculation.312
305. Id.; see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 181, § 338.
306. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 302, § 2905.
307. FED. R. EVID. 702.
308. 3 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 162, § 29.06[2][c], at 29-22.
309. See id. § 29.06[2][b][ii], at 29-18.
310. Id.
311. Id. § 29.10[4][c], at 29-70.
312. See id. In this example, the proper outcome is clear-cut. The expert is using a formula
that requires input for a certain variable, and the expert lacks any reliable basis for
estimating the variable. In other cases, though, the ruling will be more debatable. Suppose
that the expert is a psychiatrist rather than a physicist or accident reconstruction expert.
While the physicist relied on an arithmetic formula as his major premise, the psychiatrist
might derive her major premise, the diagnostic criteria for a certain mental illness, from the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (5th ed. 2013). Assume
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D. The Legal Sufficiency of the Case-Specific Factual Information
to Support the Expert’s Opinion vs. the Adequacy of the
Empirical Factual Information to Validate the Expert’s
Methodology
To understand the limited nature of the judge’s power under Rule
702(b) to determine the legal sufficiency of the case-specific information to support the expert’s opinion, before closing, we should
distinguish that power from the judge’s authority under Daubert
and Rule 702(c) to determine the adequacy of the validation of the
“principles and methods” that serve as the expert’s major premise.
To an extent, the two powers are parallel. In the former setting, the
judge passes on the sufficiency of the case-specific data to justify the
expert’s opinion.313 In the latter setting, the judge must decide the
adequacy of the empirical data that supposedly validates the expert’s methodology; that is, the judge must determine whether the
expert has marshaled enough empirical data and reasoning to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that by using the general
methodology, the expert can accurately draw the type of inference
that he or she proposes testifying to.314
However, in another respect, the parallel breaks down; the judge’s
Rule 702(b) authority is much more limited than the latter power.
Part IV.A explained that the judge cannot pass on the credibility of
the case-specific information underlying the opinion; the credibility
that the manual describes one of the criteria listed for the disorder in question in rather
ambiguous terms. For example, the criterion might be that the patient experienced “frequent”
or “numerous” bouts of anxiety. In the instant case, the expert’s minor premise information
includes secondhand, out-of-court reports about three such incidents over a two-year period.
The expert testifies that, in her judgment, proof of three incidents satisfies the frequency or
numerosity criterion. The same judge who has no difficulty ruling the physicist’s opinion
inadmissible may struggle in deciding whether to admit the psychiatrist’s opinion. If the
ultimate objective is to prevent the jury from making a truly irrational decision, the judge
may be reluctant to exercise his or her power under Rule 702(b) to exclude the psychiatrist’s
opinion. The judge may be inclined to defer to the expert’s experience in deciding whether to
characterize three incidents in a two-year period as frequent or numerous. Part IV.B pointed
out that, in applying the second sentence of Rule 703, it is legitimate to consider the
customary practices in the expert’s field.
313. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Daubert Line of Authority: Perspective and
Synthesis, 56 CRIM. L. BULL. 978, 988-1002 (2020).
314. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Best Insurance Against Miscarriages of Justice Caused
by Junk Science: An Admissibility Test that Is Scientifically and Legally Sound, 81 ALBANY
L. REV. 851, 857 (2018); see Imwinkelried, supra note 313, at 988-1002.
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decision belongs to the jury. Yet, as previously stated, the Daubert
Court explicitly stated that when the judge determines the adequacy of the validation, the judge applies the Rule 104(a) procedure315 that empowers the judge to assess the credibility of the
information.316 One might ask: If the drafters had enough faith in
lay jurors’ decision-making to restrict the judge’s role in determining whether a lay witness possesses personal knowledge (Rule
602)317 or a letter is authentic (Rule 901),318 why give the judge a
much larger role in determining whether the expert’s general
methodology is valid?
The answer is that we can afford to place much greater faith in
the jury on issues such as whether a lay witness has personal
knowledge of the fact or event they allegedly observed or whether a
letter was written by the purported author. We are confident that
lay jurors are competent to decide such straightforward questions.
More significantly, we can be reasonably confident that if they conclude during deliberations that the witness did not see the fight or
that the letter is a forgery, their exposure to the evidence and the
related foundational testimony will not distort the remainder of
their deliberations. To use the vernacular, the jury has decided that
the witness “doesn’t know what he’s talking about” or that the exhibit “isn’t worth the paper it’s written on.”319 Even without the
benefit of any legal training, once the jurors reach that conclusion,
common sense will naturally lead them to put the evidence and the
related foundational testimony out of mind. They will disregard it.
There is thus little risk that their exposure to the evidence will
distort the balance of their deliberations.
In sharp contrast, that risk is acute when the issue is the validation of an expert methodology.320 Several factors drastically
increase the magnitude of the risk.

315. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
316. See FED. R. EVID. 104 advisory committee’s note to 1987 amendment; Imwinkelried,
supra note 69, at 12.
317. See FED. R. EVID. 602.
318. See FED. R. EVID. 901.
319. See CARLSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 95-96.
320. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of
Preliminary Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 577, 581 (1984).
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While the foundational testimony for facts governed by Rule
104(b) usually tends to be short, the validation testimony for expert
methodologies is ordinarily quite lengthy. It may take all of a
minute to lay a perfectly proper Rule 602 foundation to show that
a witness observed the event that she proposes testifying about.321
In a famous Florida case involving a challenge to moving radar
speedometers, the record of the hearing consumed over two thousand pages.322 It is one thing to put aside the memory of testimony
that consumed less than a handful of minutes at trial. It is quite
another matter to disregard testimony that you sat through for
hours or even days.
In the jurors’ minds, issues such as firsthand knowledge and
authenticity are binary: either the witness saw the accident, or she
did not.323 Either the purported author wrote the letter, or he did
not.324 In contrast, validation testimony is often probabilistic in
nature.325 As the Daubert Court recognized, expert techniques and
theories have an error rate.326 What if the technique in question
has such a high error rate that, at a conscious level, the juror decides that the technique is invalid, but the accuracy rate hovers
around random chance, and the expert on the stand had either
dazzling credentials or a charismatic personality? There is an
obvious risk that, at least at a subconscious level, the exposure to
the witness’s testimony will influence the jurors’ deliberation.327
While testimony about everyday facts and events is usually readily comprehensible, validation testimony can be dense material,
which requires the jurors to expend substantial mental energy to
understand.328 When a juror has invested considerable effort into
thinking about the testimony, it may make it all the more difficult
for the juror to put the testimony out of mind even if, at a conscious

321. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS § 3.03[3], at 30-31 (11th ed.
2020).
322. See Florida Trial Court Finds Radar Evidence Unreliable, 25 CRIM. L. REP. 2189, 2189
(1979) (discussing State v. Aquilera, a case from the County Court for Dade County, Florida).
323. See Imwinkelried, supra note 320, at 600-01.
324. See id.
325. See id. at 604.
326. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
327. Id. at 602-04.
328. See id. at 604-05.
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level, they have decided that the testimony is technically inadmissible.329
In short, if our objective is a rational division of authority between the judge and the jury, it makes eminently good sense to give
the judge much more extensive power over the testimony validating
the expert’s major premise than over the testimony identifying the
case-specific information constituting the expert’s minor premise.
CONCLUSION
As the Introduction pointed out, this Article has a very limited
objective. The Article does not address many of the major current
controversies about expert testimony. For example, as previously
stated, the Article does not advance any proposals for improving
the analysis of the reliability of nonscientific expert methodologies.
That has proven to be a vexing epistemological problem for the
courts.330 Likewise, the Article does not discuss the question of
whether the courts should expand the notion of validating a
methodology to include a showing of validity as applied as well as
foundational validity.331 Nor does the Article offer any proposals for
the problem that the Federal Rules Advisory Committee is now
studying, namely, overstated expert testimony, such as testimony
by experts who make the ludicrous claim that their methodology has
“a zero error rate.”332
This Article has a much more modest goal: eliminating some of
the confusion about the analysis of the “factual” bases for expert
opinions admitted under the Federal Rules. Provisions such as
Federal Rules 702(b) and 703 purport to assign the judge certain

329. See id. (citing psychological authorities I. HUNTER, MEMORY 24-25 (1966); R. KLATZKY,
HUMAN MEMORY: STRUCTURES AND PROCESSING 21-26 (2d ed. 1980); and E. ZECHMEISTER &
S. NYBERG, HUMAN MEMORY: AN INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH AND THEORY (1982) as
supporting the propositions that a memory is likely to be durable and more indelible if a
person must study the information more intently to understand it and that psychology recognizes the notion of depth of processing).
330. See generally Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, supra note 28; Edward J. Imwinkelried, Admissibility of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, supra note 28; Imwinkelried, Next Step After Daubert, supra note 28.
331. See Imwinkelried, supra note 4, at 817.
332. See Susan Steinman, Expert Witness Amendments in the Works, 57 TRIAL, Feb. 2021,
at 60.
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responsibilities in conducting that analysis.333 Yet, many judicial
opinions contain the sweeping generalization that under the Federal
Rules, all questions about the credibility, soundness, weakness, or
weight of the opinion’s factual bases are matters for the jury.
To eliminate that confusion, the Article begins at the most logical
starting point, the Federal Rule provisions that contain the expression “facts or data”: Rules 702(b), 703, and 705. Because those
words were the product of careful parsing by both the Judicial Conference and Congress, it is reasonable to assume that the drafters
intended the expression to have the same meaning in each Rule.334
The problem is that considered in isolation, the words are problematic. “Facts” could easily mean case-specific facts related to the
minor premise in the expert’s reasoning. However, “data” has the
connotation of empirical research data related to validating the
expert’s major premise, the general methodology, technique, or
theory that the expert proposes to rely on. Determining the meaning
of “facts or data” presents a classic problem in statutory construction. Although this problem has divided the courts in the past, the
trend and the better view is that the expression denotes only casespecific facts.335 The text, context, and legislative history of Rule 703
all point toward that narrow view; and if that is the proper interpretation of the expression in Rule 703, it should also dictate the
meaning of the identical words in Rules 702(b) and 705.336
Once we accept that construction of “facts or data,” it becomes
evident that the generalization that all questions about the factual
bases of expert opinions are matters for the jury is badly overstated.
The generalization holds true only in the sense that the jury has
the ultimate authority to decide the credibility of any case-specific
information that the expert premises his or her opinion upon.337
Whether the expert purports to have personal knowledge of the fact
under Rule 602, a third party supplies testimony under Rule 602 to
provide an element of a hypothetical question posed to the expert,
333. See FED. R. EVID. 702, 703.
334. Imwinkelried, supra note 169, at 369; see In Pari Materia, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019) (defining the canon of statutory construction which states that statutory
language of the same subject matter should be construed together).
335. See Imwinkelried, supra note 169, at 361, 365.
336. Id. at 365.
337. See Imwinkelried, supra note 320, at 592.
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or the judge allows the expert to rely on a secondhand, out-of-court
report under 703, the judge cannot bar the testimony merely because he or she disbelieves the information; the judge plays a
limited screening role, and the jury makes the final decision
whether to believe the testimony.338
However, in two other significant respects, the generalization is
plainly false. First, under Rule 703, the judge makes the qualitative
determination of whether the expert is including in his or her minor
premise a kind or type of information that experts in his or her field
reasonably rely on.339 Since Rule 703 uses the expression “reasonably” rather than “customarily” or “routinely,” the ultimate authority rests with the judge.340 The judge may certainly consider the
expert’s testimony about the customary practice in his or her discipline; and in many, if not most, cases the judge will likely defer to
the expert’s choice.341 However, the judge may not delegate that
decision to either the expert or the jury.342 Rule 703 casts the judge
in the role of the final arbiter of the reliability of the type of
information or source that the expert proposes factoring into their
minor premise. Hence, the judge has a residual discretion to override the specialty’s customary practice.343
Likewise, the generalization breaks down with respect to the
quantitative determination of whether the expert has cited “sufficient” facts to support the opinion. Rule 702(b) requires the judge to
make that determination. As Part IV.C explained, assigning that
task to the judge is perfectly consistent with the allocation of the
credibility determination to the jury. At trial, the jury ordinarily
determines the credibility of the testimony. However, the judge has
an overarching responsibility to police the rationality of the jury’s
fact-finding.344 At the microcosm level, even when Rule 104(b) assigns to the jury the final decisions on such issues as a lay witness’s
personal knowledge or an exhibit’s authenticity, the judge can
prevent the jury from ever hearing the witness’s testimony about
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Id.
See Imwinkelried, supra note 29, at 467-68.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 467.
See Imwinkelried, supra note 320, at 579.

772

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:719

the event or the letter if the judge concludes that the foundational
testimony is “insufficient” to support a rational jury finding of
personal knowledge or authenticity.345 At the macrocosm level, even
when the party with the burden of going forward succeeds in
introducing every item of evidence he or she offers during the casein-chief, the judge can make a peremptory ruling, precluding the
case from even reaching the jury, if the judge concludes that, at face
value, the party’s testimony lacks sufficient probative value to
justify a rational jury finding on the disputed element of the cause
of action or crime.346 In that light, Rule 702(b)’s allocation of authority to the judge is not an outlier; rather, it is simply another
manifestation of the judge’s broader power and responsibility to
ensure that the jury’s fact-finding remains within a rational range.
As the Introduction noted, the primary source of confusion about
the evaluation of the factual bases for expert opinions has been a
failure to take into account the narrow scope of “facts or data” in
Rules 702(b), 703, and 705. Once the courts appreciate the narrow
meaning of that expression, the courts will also realize the misleading nature of the facile generalization that all questions about
the factual bases are matters for the jury. They will see that the
drafters have devised a sensible division of labor and authority
among the judge, jury, and expert. Although the jury has the
plenary power to decide the credibility of the case-specific information the expert has included in his or her minor premise, as part
of the earlier admissibility analysis, the judge makes the qualitative
decision necessitated by Rule 703 and the quantitative decision that
Rule 702(b) calls for. It may be true that “clarity is the hardest
thing.”347 However, if the question is the assessment of the factual
bases for expert opinions, and the courts embrace the correct,
narrow construction of “facts or data,” clarity is attainable here.

345. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
346. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 181, § 338.
347. BARNES, supra note 1, at 102.

